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Introduction
Consider the following two seemingly unrelated issues: a) A national or supranational agency ponders over whether to foster individual R&D activities and to encourage cooperation in R&D among rival firms. While it cannot force firms to enter cooperation agreements or prevent them from engaging in R&D separately, it can provide some firms with incentives (subsidies) to invest in R&D or, conversely, to coordinate their R&D policies (for example through a joint venture). At stake in this policy choice is the trade-off between the social benefits from competition and the social costs of R&D duplication. b) Each of two sovereign jurisdictions decides whether to invest in a local public good (school, station, ...) exerting a negative externality on the other jurisdiction (for example, it increases competition for business and residential citizens). A central government's policy may encourage or deter the production of the public good by each jurisdiction and may also coordinate the provision of the two public goods. At stake in the central government's policy is the potential excessive competition between jurisdictions.
Despite their distinct flavor, these two economic problems share a common conceptual structure. In both cases, a principal (agency, central government) designs a mechanism to coordinate the activities of two competing agents (firms, jurisdictions).
The principal can use socially costly transfers to maximize expected social welfare and faces two constraints. First, he must elicit the agents' preferences for separate and joint activities. Second, as agents are sovereign, he must induce them to take part in his coordinating scheme and not to go on their own.
Our model has two agents. Each agent has some information about a parameter (type) which affects his payoff and decides whether to "produce" (or "invest", or "engage in R&D"...). A principal proposes a menu of contracts to the two agents.
Contracts specify a probability of producing (alone or both agents together) and an associated transfer. The principal has no coercive power; so an agent can refuse the contract and afterwards independently choose whether to produce. This yields a type dependent reservation utility.
If we impose budget balance, the central coordinator can alternatively organize an auction where, unlike in the standard auction of a private good, the single good may be awarded to one agent, to both agents or to neither. We show that in both cases the optimal mechanism takes the same form. In light of the interpretation of an optimal auction, this model can be considered as an extension of the work by Myerson [15] on the design of auctions, to the case of a public good with congestion externalities.
Our main results are the following. In some cases, it is optimal for the regulator to give highest type agents (i.e. the most efficient in R&D, agents with the highest valuation for the public good) informational rents. This induces underproduction with respect to the first best. In other cases, it is optimal to give rents to lowest type agents and induce overproduction compared to the first best. Which situation prevails depends on the shape of the agents' gain functions. Note that the second case can arise because, unlike in most previous regulatory analyses, we suppose reservation utilities to be type dependent. 1 The intuition is that in the first case, agents not producing receive no rents, but these rents increase steeply when production is encouraged. In this situation as it is standard in the literature, there are gains of reducing overall production: the loss of preventing agents from producing is offset by the (big) reduction of informational rents. In the second case, the opposite conclusion applies. Now, every agent not producing receives a positive rent (equal to the rent of the lowest type agent producing). Encouraging inefficient agents to produce generates a social loss (production with negative net gains) but reduces the value of the informational rents to agents not producing.
In addition to [15] , two papers are directly related to ours. [10] also studies how coordinated activities can improve efficiency. The main difference is that in [10] the externality is a fixed value which does not depend on the information of the other agent. In contrast, in our model the externality is type dependent and arises only when both agents produce; it is a degree of interaction or influence among agents. Our model therefore has a substantially larger scope of applicability. Take the education example.
Two independent cities are planning to construct a new school and have private infor-mation about the "quality" or "impact for the city" of the school. 2 As in [10] , we do not allow mobility across cities. However, if we think of the externality as competition between cities to attract new residents, then it automatically follows that the degree of the externality depends directly on the relative quality of schools. Besides, the externality arises when both cities construct the school; if only one constructs it, there is no competition. Some other examples, such as cooperative R&D ventures and other market structure issues, also naturally give rise to type dependent externalities. 3 Another point of departure from [10] is that the optimal production choice of an agent who turns down the principal's offer is contingent on both private information parameters, and therefore agents cannot be treated in isolation.
[16] is technically related to our paper. In a Defense Procurement framework, it analyzes the possibility of transferring technology from a developer to a second source (licensing). As in our model, the presence of informational rents and the fact that gain functions depend on the private information parameter of both agents bias the policy choice. However, in that model the reservation utility is constant for all types, so there are no countervailing incentives.
We present the model and the optimal mechanism in section 2.
In section 3, we analyze the bias in the optimal policy due to the asymmetry of information, we illustrate the results with a numerical example and we relate our mechanism to the optimal auction of a public good with congestion externalities. Finally, in section 4 we conclude.
The Model
We consider a model with a principal (regulator) and two competing agents. Each agent has private information about a parameter θ (henceforth his type) that affects his payoff and, possibly, the payoff of the other agent. The types
are independently drawn from distribution F (·) with strictly positive, continuous and differentiable density f (·). 4 Agents choose whether they "produce" (or "become active").
Agent i's net gain of producing is g i (θ i ) if the other agent j does not produce and h i (θ i , θ j ) if he does. For all i, θ i and θ j , we make the following assumptions:
(A1) simply formalizes the idea that the externality is negative; agents are always better-off if the other agent does not produce.
(A2) implies the following:
(i) says that when only one agent is active, there is no externality; his gain depends exclusively on his own type. For example, if only one firm invests in research for a new product line, its gain depends only on the date in which the innovation is accomplished.
(i) and (ii) state that agents' payoff increases with their type θ.
(iii) implies that the externality is stronger, the higher the other agent's type is. In the R&D race example it captures the idea that, other things equal, a firm is less likely to innovate first when it is running against a high quality rival.
(A3) assumes that low type agents (in particular θ type) are better-off if they do not produce (where the value of not producing is normalized to 0) than if they do.
Last, (A4) is an important technical assumption. It says that if the type of an agent increases, then his gain under joint activity increases more than his gain under single activity.
In this framework, call δ 0 (θ 1 , θ 2 ) = probability that no agent produces.
δ 1 (θ 1 , θ 2 ) = probability that agent 1 produces and agent 2 does not.
δ 2 (θ 1 , θ 2 ) = probability that agent 2 produces and agent 1 does not.
δ 12 (θ 1 , θ 2 ) = probability that both agents produce. Each agent's utility is a function of the type of both agents:
Agent's expected utility and payoff under joint activity conditional on his own type are denoted respectively
We have
We set up a classical regulatory model where an utilitarian government maximizes agents' total utility. Assuming that the surplus is entirely captured by agents, this is equivalent to a regulator which maximizes social welfare. The regulator can make monetary transfers to agents (t 1 , t 2 ) which are socially costly. Let λ denote the (exogenous) shadow cost of public funds. Alternatively, the principal could be a private party. What matters for our theory is that the principal dislikes leaving rents to the agents and the agents are free to turn down the principal's proposal.
The timing is as follows. In the first stage, the principal proposes a menu of contracts for each agent that depends on the parameters (θ 1 ,θ 2 ) announced. The menu consists of a probability of producing (alone or both agents together) and a transfer for each agent if both accept the principal's contract, and a probability of producing and a transfer if only the agent accepts the contract. In the second stage, agents accept or refuse the menu. If both agents accept, the contract is implemented. If at least one agent refuses, he decides independently whether to produce on his own, while the other agent's contract (if he has accepted) is implemented. Without loss of generality, we can assume that the principal's contract is accepted with probability 1 by both agents. For, the principal can always duplicate the outcome of any perfect Bayesian equilibrium in which agents turn down the offer with positive probability by (i) offering the probabilities and transfers defined by this equilibrium and (ii) threatening each agent with his worst possible outcome (defined by the other agent's investing with probability 1) if he refuses. So, the government threat is to induce the agent accepting the menu to produce through a high enough transfer, in case the other agent refuses. The expected transfer required to induce production of the agent who accepted the contract can be very large, but is costless because it is made only off-the-equilibrium path. Finally, the third stage gain (no agreement) of the agent who refused the contract then depends on the types of both agents but not on the other agent's decision. Its expected value,
, will be reflected in the Individual Rationality constraint.
Definitions and preliminary results
As already pointed out, our analysis closely follows the methodological approach introduced in [15] . In order to characterize the equilibrium of this game, let us introduce the following definitions.
is feasible if the following conditions are satisfied:
Definition 2: A mechanism M is optimal if it solves the problem P defined as max δ 0 ;δ 1 ;δ 2 ;δ 12
Assumption (I) guarantees that the leftmost expression and the rightmost expression converge to
We now introduce the following definition.
Definition 3: A mechanism M is an I-mechanism if it satisfies assumption (I) above.
Note that problem P in Definition 2 involves a continuum of (IR) constraints.
However, we can now state.
Lemma 1: Suppose M is an I-mechanism. Then (IC), (IR) and (F) are equivalent to (IC), (IR 1), (IR 2) and (F) where (IR 1) and (IR 2) are defined by:
Proof: Naturally, (IR) implies (IR 1) and (IR 2) so suppose that (IC), (IR 1), (IR 2) and (F) are satisfied.
From (3), (F) and Assumption (A2) it follows thatθ
Therefore, U i (·) is nondecreasing and (IR 1) implies that
Now take θ i < θ. From (2) we know that
Which can be rewritten as
By (F) and assumptions (A2) and (A4), the left hand side of the inequality cannot be positive. So we conclude that:
From a practical perspective, this Lemma states that for each agent we only have to check that the (IR) constraint is satisfied at θ and θ. We are ready to prove the first proposition which consists of a simplified characterization of a feasible mechanism.
Proposition 1: An I-mechanism M is feasible if and only if the following conditions are satisfied:
Proof: Using (2), we see that (IC) implies (a). Settingθ i = θ in (2) yields (b). Last, (c) follows from (IR) as a consequence of Lemma 1. 2
The next result offers simpler conditions for optimality.
subject to (a) and (F) and for each i define the transfers:
in the objective function, we get that problem
If the transfers are chosen according to (4), then
0, which is the best possible value of this term in (6). Thus the transfers t i can entirely be dropped from the problem, leaving only the problem given in the statement of the proposition to be solved. 2
It is important to realize that in the mechanism M defined above, (IR 1) is binding and (IR 2) is slack (except when (5) is satisfied with equality): the participation constraint binds, for each agent i, only at the bottom (i.e. only for agents of type θ). We now prove the analogous proposition for the following case.
If
for each i, then the I-mechanism M = (δ 0 , δ 1 , δ 2 , δ 12 , t 1 , t 2 ) is optimal.
Proof: Settingθ i = θ in (2), we have:
Using the same reasoning as before, the proof naturally follows. 2
Unlike in the previous proposition, when this mechanism is optimal (IR 1) is slack (except when (8) is satisfied with equality) and (IR 2) is binding: the participation constraint binds, for each agent i, only at the top (i.e. only for agents of type θ).
Optimal mechanism
Let us define the following functions
These functions represent what we could call the "virtual gains" associated with problems P1 and P2. In fact, these functions consist simply of the agents' gains and a distortion factor called for by the asymmetry of information. This factor, which captures the rents left to the agents, depends on the shape of the functions g(·) and h(·, ·).
6
Given our previous assumptions, the following regularity conditions are needed in order to compute the optimal mechanism: Definition 4: A mechanism design problem is regular if the following conditions are satisfied:
The regularity (also called monotonicity) condition is usually imposed in mechanism design problems. In auction theory for example, it implies that the probability of winning the object is an increasing function of the agent's value estimate. In our setting, the interpretation is similar. As we will see in the statement of propositions 3.1 and 3.2, the two requirements are the following. First, each agent's total probability of producing (alone or jointly with the other agent) must be an increasing function of his type. Second, each agent's probability of joint production must also be an increasing function of his own type.
We can now state the main propositions of our paper. They consist of a characterization of the optimal mechanism in our problem.
Proposition 3.1: Suppose that a mechanism design problem is regular and let
2 ) be the I-mechanism defined as:
then M x is an optimal mechanism.
Proof: As a result of Proposition 2.1, it suffices to prove that M x satisfies condition (a).
Note that the regularity condition (α) implies (i) that δ
is monotone increasing in θ i for each θ j and (ii) that δ then M z is an optimal mechanism.
Proof: Using Proposition 2.2 and the regularity condition (β), the proof follows the same lines so it is omitted. 2
Under full information (FI), the total gains if no agent is active, if only agent i is active and if both agents are active are respectively 0, g i (θ i ) and h 1 (θ 1 , θ 2 )+h 2 (θ 1 , θ 2 ).
Trivially, the regulator induces the activity of the agent(s) yielding the highest total payoff.
Under asymmetric information, this choice is modified. Now, the probabilities of activity are set to maximize total virtual gains. It is the analogous condition of the FI case except for the inclusion of a distortion factor in every gain function. The regulator, as before, wants to maximize total gains but now he must internalize the informational rents left to the agents in order to induce truthful revelation of their type.
Those distortions differ in Propositions 3.1 and 3.2 because, as we will show in the next section, the constraints binding when C Once the construction of the optimal mechanism is completed, we must identify sufficient conditions for this mechanism to be regular.
Assumption 5:
d 3 Interpretation of the results 
Compatibility of mechanisms
x is the only optimal mechanism.
• case 2: C x i < 0 and C z i > 0 ⇔ (IR 1) and (IR 2) bind, neither M x nor M z is optimal.
• case 3: C z i < 0 ⇔ M z is the only optimal mechanism.
Proof: From Propositions 2.1 and 2.2, let us rewrite the expected utilities as:
. Therefore, using (α), (β) and (F) we have for all i and θ j :
where δ Note also that U
and, by construction U Naturally, the probabilities of activity crucially depend on which is the optimal mechanism.
When C x i > 0, the (IR) constraint binds only at the bottom so agents not producing receive no informational rents. In this case, by refraining production of agents within a certain interval [θ, θ * ] (where g i (θ) = 0, see Figure 1 ) the regulator faces the standard trade-off efficiency vs. rents 9 and, as usual, there is underproduction compared to the first best case.
The analysis changes when M z is the optimal mechanism. In that case, if (as under FI) production is deterred for types in [θ,θ], all these agents get a rent of U z i (θ). By inducing types in [θ * * ,θ] to produce (where θ * * ≤θ, see Figure 3 ) the regulator faces again a trade-off. Now the cost is that the activity of these agents generates negative gains. The benefit is that types in [θ, θ * * ] get a rent equal to
. The optimal value θ * * depends on the relative extent of the previous effects, but in any case there is overproduction. 10 Naturally, the trade-off to determine when both agents or only the most efficient one should produce is analogous.
Some policy implications follow from this analysis.
Corollary 2:
• When M x is optimal, there is "underproduction", i.e. joint activity is less likely and no activity is more likely than under full information.
• When M z is optimal, there is "overproduction", i.e. joint activity is more likely and no activity is less likely than under full information.
Proof: Follows directly from proof of Lemma 2. 2
This result is represented in Figure 4 .
Given that a complete characterization of the optimal mechanisms is not possible,
11
it is important to find sufficient conditions under which either M x or M z is optimal.
From Propositions 3.1. and 3.2, it follows that:
Assume that H i (θ i ) is "sufficiently large":
• If
(ii) • For any H i (θ) < 0 if g i (θ i ) is "sufficiently close" to 0 then M z is optimal.
• For any
Proof: Part (i) is trivial.
Call θ the value of θ i s.t.
If g i (θ i ) → 0 then:
The proof when
Part (i) is just a restatement of standard results in the literature on incentives.
When H i (θ) ≤ 0, the reservation utility is constant so the optimal second best contract entails underproduction. When H i (θ) → 0 the value of the exit option increases faster than the informational rents, so there is inefficient overproduction.
12
More interesting is the result in part (ii). Recall that, because of the regulator's threat, the shape of the exit option depends exclusively on the marginal gains when both agents produce. In contrast, the shape of the agents' rents depends also on the marginal gains of single production. Hence, when the latter are relatively important, M x is optimal and underproduction is encouraged. Conversely, when marginal gains of single production are minor (always relatively to marginal gains under joint production) the optimal second best contract M z entails overprovision of goods.
In section 3.2, we illustrate this idea with a numerical example.
Example
Suppose that θ i is uniformly distributed in [0, 2] and let the gain functions be:
As we want to focus on the decision of one vs. both agents producing, we assume w.l.o.g. that g i (θ) > 0. 13 The other assumptions are satisfied: and k= 1 6 , we have: Table I .
Obviously, λ and k are suitably chosen so that we get the three possible cases in the interval α ∈ [0, 0.67] but the idea is always the same. ∂h i ∂θ i (θ i , θ j ) is constant so the only influence in the variation of the areas of activity comes through the marginal increase of g(·). As Corollary 3 suggests,
is optimal if and only if g i (θ i ) is "sufficiently large" (resp. "sufficiently small"). This result is confirmed in Table I .
The cases α = 
Auction of a public good with externalities
Suppose that we modify our setting in two directions. First, we assume that the principal has coercive power: agents may misreport their type but if they turn down the principal's contract they cannot take actions independently. Then, the reservation utility becomes 0 independently of the agent's type and, by Corollary 3, the mechanism M x is always optimal. Second, we impose a budget balance policy. Formally, this is easily achieved by setting the cost of raising funds λ → ∞.
Once we introduce these two adjustments, it is straightforward to notice that our mechanism M x can be interpreted as an extension of the work [15] to the case of the optimal auction of a public good with congestion externalities. 15 Unlike in the standard auction of a "private" good, the seller may award the single and indivisible unit to both bidders (although in this case there is an externality since each "winner" is negatively affected by the presence of another "winner"). On the other hand, as there is only one unit of good, the problem is different from a multi-unit auction.
16
Remarks:
• Recall that (A1) and (A2) state that there is an externality only if both bidders get the good. Therefore, if we rule out the possibility of awarding the good to both potential buyers (i.e. we impose δ 12 = 0) the probabilities of selling the good (δ 0 , δ 1 , δ 2 ) take the standard form of an auction without externalities where the seller's value of keeping the good is 0.
• More interesting, suppose that at most one bidder may get the good but the winner always bears the (type dependent) externality. Formally, it implies that the net gain of bidder i is 0 if he does not win the auction and h i (θ i , θ j ) if he does. This is the case considered in [15] . We can check that the optimal mechanism takes the same form as in that paper, namely:
Surprisingly, most studies in auction theory assume that the opportunity cost of participating in an auction is constant for all bidders.
17 However, given the federalist structure of many governments, auctions where bidders have type dependent reservation utilities are common. Think of the following situation. A central government organizes an auction to coordinate the decision of two sovereign local jurisdictions to build a radio station (naturally, each jurisdiction is adversely affected by the other having the station). If both jurisdictions accept to participate, they submit bids (according to their valuation for the project) and either none, one or both obtain the license for the construction. As each jurisdiction has the power to refuse the central government's proposal, the opportunity cost of participating in the auction (instead of deciding independently whether to construct the station) depends on the valuation for the project. Therefore, the optimal auction entails a type dependent reservation utility of bidders and it is characterized by our general formulation given in Definition 2.
Conclusion
Our work extends mechanism design to allow for sovereign, interacting agents. It characterizes the optimal second best contract in a model of a principal and two interrelated agents, where the agents are free to refuse the principal's contract and pursue actions on their own. We have established conditions under which total gains are maximized when both agents are active or when only the most efficient one is. The answer crucially depends on the structure of the agents' gain functions. In particular, we have shown that the distortion functions depend on the marginal gains. Asymmetric information biases the optimal decision in favor of only one active agent when marginal gains of single production are "large" and in favor of two active agents when they are "small" relative to marginal gains under joint production. Besides, we have argued that our mechanism also represents the optimal auction of a public good with congestion externalities and possibility of excluding agents. Finally, we feel that the extension of mechanism design to sovereign, interacting agents is warranted in view of the prevalence of federalist structures, limited regulatory powers, or absence of slavery in various situations.
The analysis has interesting applications; for example it has often been argued For a detailed analysis of optimal contracts with type dependent Individual Rationality constraints see [9] , [12] , and [14] . However, unlike in our paper and in [10] , in these works there is no endogenous relation between the payoff function if the contract is accepted and the outside opportunity or payoff function if the contract is refused.
2. We are assuming that cities maximize the welfare of a representative resident.
3. See [5] for the discussion of some applications such as optimal structure of an industry, coordination of R&D activities and provision of fringe benefits in a firm.
4. [6] shows that, when the private information parameters are correlated, first best outcomes can be achieved.
5. We are extremely grateful to the referee of this journal for the statement and proof of this lemma.
6. Note the similarity between these virtual gains and the function σ(γ, θ, q) for γ ∈ {0, 1} in [9] .
7. Note that the mechanism M x is not defined on the set A = {(θ 1 , θ 2 )|x 1 (θ 1 ) = x 2 (θ 2 ) > max[0, 2 k=1 x * k (θ 1 , θ 2 )]}. However, given the continuity of F (·), A has probability 0.
8. The same remark as in the previous footnote applies for the mechanism M z .
9. See e.g. [1] or [11] for an extensive discussion of this point.
10. Note that in our particular framework, "overproduction" stands for production of two agents (rather than one) for a larger range of values of θ 1 and θ 2 than under full information.
11. Our conjecture (although not formally shown) is that in case 2, where both (IR 1) and (IR 2) bind, there will be some areas with more production and others with less production than in first best.
12.
[13] studies the contract offered to a worker whose skills are valued by other potential employers. This leads to an opportunity wage which increases with the
